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The Supreme Court has wrapped itself in a great deal of controversy
during the latter half of this century by forcing change on people who have not
wanted it. Its decisions have altered police practices, eliminated prayer from
public institutions, curtailed the death penalty, ordered busing of children to
new schools, and struck down longstanding laws on a variety of subjects
ranging from flag burning, to loitering, to abortion. This history would suggest
to many observers that the Court has no particular fondness for the status quo
and, indeed, that the Court is quite willing to use its docket to rework society.
Professor Cass Sunstein does not share this view. In his new book, The
Partial Constitution,' Sunstein faults the Court not for imposing change on an
unreceptive nation, but instead for making the status quo a "baseline" for
judging the constitutionality of action or inaction by the government.2 In
Sunstein's view, the Supreme Court tends to uphold laws that leave existing
distributions of wealth and opportunity alone, while treating laws that alter
them as constitutionally suspect.
3
Sunstein believes that the Court favors the status quo because it thinks that
the status quo is neutral. According to Sunstein, however, this view is wrong.
In The Partial Constitution, Sunstein strives to explain that the status quo
usually is not neutral because it is rarely determined solely by natural forces.
Sunstein asserts that a myriad of background laws, such as the common law
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I. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTrTUON (1993) [hereinafter THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION].
For other reviews of The Partial Constitution, see Sanford Levinson, Unnatural Law, NEw REPUBLIC, July
19 & 26, 1993, at 40; John 0. McGinnis, The Partial Republican, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming
1994); Paul Reidinger, By and for the People, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1993, at 96; Mark Tushnet, The Bricoleur
at the Center, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1071 (1993); Book Note, The Partial Partial Constitution, 107 HARV.
L. REv. 493 (1993). Sunstein published another book last year entitled CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
2. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 3.
3. Id.
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of property and contracts, have helped to shape the distribution of resources
in America over the centuries.4 As a result, the status quo may lack fairness
and legitimacy if the background laws that have shaped it lack legitimacy.'
What troubles Sunstein most is the possibility that, by interpreting the
Constitution to prefer the status quo over change, the Court's opinions favor
those who currently enjoy benefits under the law, and disfavor those who do
not. Favoring existing distributions, in other words, may make the Constitution
"partial" to some and not to others. Sunstein asserts that the Court should
cease preferring the status quo over change when it interprets the Constitution.
He maintains that, properly interpreted, the Constitution generally empowers
the government to alter legal interests so long as it acts in a manner consistent
with what he calls "deliberative democracy.
' 6
Sunstein clearly has thought long about his arguments,7 and he presents
them in a logically organized and impressively detailed manner. Yet, the claim
that the Supreme Court has taken an excessively conservative approach to
change does not accord with a casual observation of the Court's cases, which
appear to be constantly reshaping various facets of American life. The Partial
Constitution's thesis suggests, moreover, that the Constitution mandates even
greater departures from the status quo than those which the Court already has
ordered. Sunstein contends that Congress has a constitutional duty to undertake
various redistributive projects, such as funding abortion in certain cases.' He
also argues that current anti-obscenity laws may violate the First Amendment,
except to the extent that they prohibit depiction of violence against women.
9
Although Sunstein says much that is convincing, the central argument in
The Partial Constitution has several problems. Sunstein does not prove that it
is possible to generalize about whether the Constitution requires, permits, or
forbids using the status quo as a baseline for decisionmaking. He does not
show and probably cannot show that the Constitution embraces deliberative
democracy or any other abstract principles in a consistent manner. Finally, he
does not demonstrate that the Court actually has given the status quo the
sanctity that Sunstein alleges.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Sunstein notes in the preface, id. at vi, that he based The Partial Constitution on the following
articles and essays that he previously has written: Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992);
Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92
COLuM. L. REV. 1 (1992); The Limits of Compensatory Justice, in NOMOS XXXIII: COMPENSATORY
JUsTICE (John v. Chapman ed., 1991); What Judge Bork Should Have Said, 23 CONN. L. REV. 205 (1991)
(book review); Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With Particular
Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990); Preferences and Politics, 20
PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 3 (1990); Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987); Naked Preferences and
the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984).
8. See THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note I, at 315-17.
9. See id. at 269-70.
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These problems, though significant, do not undermine the aim of his book,
which is to relax inhibitions against political actions altering the status quo.
Ironically, Sunstein's project is more likely to be undermined by his argument
backfiring than by any holes in that argument. In other words, insistence that
governmental action accord with Sunstein's vision of deliberative democracy
might inhibit more change than it would foster.
I. SUMMARY
Although any short summary of The Partial Constitution has to leave out
a great deal of detail,'0 Sunstein's argument does not defy a brief outline. The
Partial Constitution is split into two parts. The first examines a variety of
questions that arise when the government attempts to change the status quo.
The second applies the ideas developed in the first part to a host of currently
controversial constitutional issues.
A. Status Quo Neutrality and Constitutional Interpretation
In discussing the government's obligations with respect to the status quo,
Sunstein addresses three topics: (1) the "impartiality principle" in constitutional
law, (2) the "status quo neutrality" conception of impartiality, and (3) the
proper manner of interpreting the Constitution. Although these ideas may
sound rather abstract, Sunstein lays them out in straightforward terms.
1. The Impartiality Principle
Sunstein claims that the Constitution generally requires the government to
treat citizens impartially, meaning that it may not distribute "resources to one
person or group rather than to another on the sole ground that those benefited
[by the distribution] have exercised political power in order to obtain
government assistance."" In other words, no group-men, women, Christians,
or others-should have special benefits merely because its members have
managed to elect sympathetic representatives into office.
Where does this "impartiality principle" come from? Sunstein finds support
for it in the history and text of the Constitution. He reports that a common idea
"echoed" throughout the founding period that the United States should be a
"republic of reasons" and a "deliberative democracy,"' 2 rather than a nation
10. Sunstein has packed the book with discussions of many interesting issues. Moreover, where other
authors might give one or two examples to support their points, Sunstein rarely settles for less than a half
dozen, as he takes the reader through lists of constitutional provisions, Supreme Court cases, and
hypothetical questions. To appreciate the book fully, one really must read it in its entirety.
II. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 39.
12. Id. at 20.
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governed by "the self-interest of private groups.' 13 The framers, Sunstein
asserts, wanted participants in government to persuade their opponents through
logical reasoning, rather than merely to outvote them. He notes, for example,
that James Madison said that he wanted to create a government that would
consist of men "whose wisdom [will] discern the true interest of their country
and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations."' 4 Sunstein has found similar quotations
from Thomas Jefferson, 15 Roger Sherman, 16 and Alexander Hamilton. 7
The Constitution, according to Sunstein, embodies the impartiality
principle, in greater and lesser degrees, in a variety of places. For example, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the so-called dormant
Commerce Clause prohibit protectionism or, as Sunstein puts it, "measures that
citizens of one state enact in order to benefit themselves at the expense of out-
of-staters."' 8 Sunstein sees the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses as
general expressions of the same idea, in that they forbid the government from
benefiting or discriminating against any group without providing
justifications.' 9 The Eminent Domain Clause, he observes, likewise allows the
government to take property only for public use, and not for the private use of
others.2" The Contract Clause, Sunstein notes, affords further protection
against government partiality by preventing those in power from undoing
agreements if they later become disadvantageous to one side.2'
2. Status Quo Neutrality-A Misconception of Impartiality
Sunstein argues that although the Court has recognized the requirement of
impartiality, it often misconceives the meaning of impartiality. According to
Sunstein, the Court has taken the position that the government acts neutrally
or impartially when it does not interfere with existing distributions of rights
and opportunities. Sunstein labels this conception of impartiality, which he
considers misguided, "status quo neutrality.,
22
Sunstein does not believe that status quo neutrality necessarily satisfies the
impartiality requirement. Distributions of resources rarely stem from wholly
13. Id.
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 134 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961), quoted in THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 20.
15. See THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 22 (condemning decision to conduct the
Constitutional Convention in secret).
16. See id. (opposing proposal giving citizens a right to "instruct" their representative on how to vote
because it would impede deliberation).
17. See id. at 24 (arguing that differences of opinion would help, rather than hinder, the functioning
of a republic).
18. Id. at 32.
19. See id. at 33-34.
20. See id. at 37.
21. See id. at 35.
22. Id. at 3-6.
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natural forces; instead, some background law-such as the common
law-usually determines who has what in our society. In Sunstein's words,
"[r]espect for existing distributions is neutral only if existing distributions are
themselves neutral. 23 He asserts that, when the status quo favors one group
over another, and thus lacks impartiality, a court should not use the status quo
as a baseline for assessing whether governmental action or inaction has
violated the impartiality principle.
Sunstein illustrates this idea with a host of Supreme Court decisions. One
of his examples is Lochner v. New York, in which the Court struck down a
state law limiting the number of hours bakers could work each week.
Reading between the lines of the opinion, Sunstein interprets the case to say
that the law violated the impartiality principle because it "transfer[red]
resources from employers to employees" and thus favored one group over
another.' He faults this reasoning because it takes "existing distributions as
the starting point for analysis. 26 Sunstein feels that the Court should have
recognized that there were background rules-in particular, the common
law-under which the bakers and their employers operated before the
legislature enacted the maximum-hour legislation, and thus realized that the
status quo was not necessarily neutral.27 Sunstein laments that other cases
from the same period also equated status quo neutrality with impartiality.2"
A more recent example is Rust v. Sullivan,29 in which Sunstein says the
Court "upheld a regulation forbidding clinics [receiving certain federal funds]
from giving advice about abortion., 31 Sunstein criticizes the decision for its
failure to recognize that conditions on federal funding may violate the First
Amendment. He explains:
23. Id. at 6.
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 47. See infra pp. 1643-45 for a differing view of
the Lochner Court's rationale.
26. THE PARTIAL CONSTITU)TION, supra note 1, at 48.
27. See id.
28. Sunstein discusses Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908), at length. In Plessy, the Court upheld racial segregation, rejecting the argument that segregation
favored one race over the other by stamping "the colored race with a badge of inferiority." 163 U.S. at 551.
The Court said that if the "colored race" experienced feelings of inferiority, "it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." Id. Sunstein
faults this analysis for failing to recognize that the "colored race" would not have chosen to interpret
segregation as implying a "badge of inferiority" in the absence of the segregation laws. THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 44. Blacks felt inferior precisely because of those background legal rules.
See id.
The Muller case upheld a maximum-hour law that applied only to women. According to Sunstein,
the Court ruled that the state action at issue was neutral because "the difference between the sexes" justified
the legislation. Id. at 62 (citing 208 U.S. at 419). Again, Sunstein contends, the Court failed to recognize
that the status quo was not natural, but was in part the creation of law: "The Court treated'the differences
between men and women as 'inherent' when in fact some of these differences were a creation of social
customs, and indeed of the legal system itself." THE PARTIAL CONSTITrrlON, supra note 1, at 62.
29. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
30. THE PARTIAL CONSTrUTION, supra note 1, at 86. For the author's differing view of the facts of
the Rust case, see infra pp. 1645-46.
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On the Court's approach, the recipient [of the funds] is the person in
the preregulatory status quo. Even if that person is pressured by a
selective funding decision, she has no basis for complaint unless she
is worse off than she was before the program was enacted. This is a
conspicuous use of the status quo as the basis for assessing whether
government has violated its obligation of neutrality.
3
'
Sunstein claims that the Court recently has made similar mistakes in others
areas of the law.
32
Despite these examples, Sunstein does not believe that the Court always
gets it wrong. The New Deal, in his view, changed America's way of thinking
about the status quo, causing many to realize that we live in a constructed
world that the government can change. Sunstein cites Shelley v. Kraemer33
as the best example of this view. In that case, the Supreme Court held that
state courts could not enforce covenants that restricted the use of real property
on the basis of race.3' The Court found it insufficient that the common law
long had allowed such covenants. In the Court's opinion, as Sunstein interprets
it, "common law principles no longer seemed merely to facilitate private
desires or to be natural, but instead emerged as a conscious social choice. 35
The Court, in other words, rejected status quo neutrality and inquired into the
justness of existing distributions. Sunstein describes other cases which he
believes embody similar conclusions.36
3. How To Interpret the Constitution
After this introduction to the ideas of impartiality and status quo neutrality,
Sunstein devotes the next three chapters of his book to the question of how to
31. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 87; see also id. at 229-30, 310.
32. Sunstein characteristically does not limit himself to a few examples, but instead discusses status
quo neutrality in the context of state action, affirmative action, de jure/de facto distinctions, sex
discrimination, definitions of liberty and property, campaign finance regulation, unconstitutional conditions,
review of agency inaction, standing, and takings. See id. at 68-92.
33. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
34. See id. at 4, 23.
35. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note I, at 56.
36. Sunstein cites three sex discrimination cases as examples: Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977), Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982). In each of these cases, states had enacted laws that reflected-at least roughly-typical
differences between men and women in our society. The statute in Goldfarb assumed that husbands
financially supported their wives, but wives did not financially support their husbands. The statute in Craig
rested on the idea that young men who drank posed more of threat to themselves and society than young
women who did so. The statute in Hogan presumed that women, but not men, wanted to become nurses.
The Court invalidated the laws in all of these cases, even though they may to some extent have
accorded with actual differences between men and women. Sunstein favors this result because "the
differences, even if 'real,' are at least to some degree creations of society: products of cultural forces,
including the legal system, that have given effect to and perpetuated differences between the sexes, or
turned these differences into social disadvantages." THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note I, at 80
(footnote omitted). The Court, in Sunstein's view, thus proparly concluded that, when the status quo fails
the impartiality test, laws perpetuating the status quo also do not satisfy it.
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interpret the Constitution. Sunstein directs his argument not just to the courts,
but also to the other branches of the government and "the citizenry at
large."37 He first sets out to refute originalism, the theory that the
Constitution means what the framers and ratifiers originally understood it to
mean. In making his argument against originalism, he concentrates almost
exclusively on Judge Robert H. Bork's exposition of the theory in his best
selling book, The Tempting of America.3s Sunstein explains that he focuses
on Bork's book "not because it is eccentric, but... because it states a certain
widely held view of constitutional neutrality.
39
Sunstein agrees with Judge Bork that judges have not followed the original
understanding of the Constitution.n0 Yet, he believes that Bork has failed to
supply adequate reasons for the conclusion that the Court has a duty to do so.
As Sunstein puts it, "the position set out in The Tempting of America is not so
much defended as proclaimed.",4' He asserts that Bork did not want to defend
originalism because any defense of the theory "would have to be rooted in
moral and political judgments" and would undermine Bork's claim that judges
must avoid such judgments by using originalism to interpret the
Constitution. 2 Sunstein explains that "no text has meaning apart from the
principles held by those who interpret it, and those principles cannot be found
in the text itself."4 3 According to Sunstein, many possible interpretive
principles exist, including originalism, but "their selection must be justified in
moral and political terms; we cannot defend a system of interpretation in law
without mounting a substantive defense." 44
37. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 10. Sunstein explains that courts have limitations
that other institutions do not, and he thus considers it a mistake to focus exclusively on courts when
discussing the Constitution. See iL at 145-53.
38. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
39. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 95.
40. Sunstein states, "It is surprising but true that many of the principles of constitutional liberty most
prized by Americans were created, not by the founders, but by the Supreme Court during this century." Id.
at 97.
41. Id. at 103. As Sunstein portrays it, Judge Bork makes only three half-hearted attempts to defend
originalism, each of which is unconvincing. First, Bork asserts that the choice to follow the original
understanding "was made long ago by those who designed and enacted the Constitution." Id. at 99 (quoting
BORK, supra note 38, at 177). Sunstein finds this statement circular and unpersuasive. He responds that
Bork is saying merely "that the original understanding is binding because the original understanding was
that the original understanding is binding." THE PARTIAL CONSITI.TION, supra note 1, at 99. Second, Bork
argues that the Court must follow the original understanding because the people never authorized it to do
otherwise. Id. at 99-100 (citing BORK, supra note 38, at 201). Sunstein responds that "a tight connection
with a specific previous decision of the polity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
legitimacy." THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 100. According to Sunstein, whether the
Supreme Court's decisions deserve respect depends on whether "some amalgam of substantive political
reasons" justify obedience to them. Id. Third, Bork believes that abandoning the original understanding
would require judges to make "moral choices" not subject to a rational defense. Id. at 100-01 (citing BORK,
supra note 38, at 258-59). Sunstein finds this argument unpersuasive because "Bork's own approach...
relies on [a] political and moral decision[]"-the very decision to follow the original understanding. THE
PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note I, at 101.
42. THE PARTIAL CONsTITUTION, supra note 1, at 103.
43. Id. at 101.
44. Id. at 102.
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On similar, although not identical grounds, Sunstein rejects several other
constitutional theories, including those of Professors Laurence Tribe, John Hart
Ely, and Ronald Dworkin.45 He then turns to the affirmative task of
identifying what he thinks should control the meaning of the Constitution.
Sunstein says, in particular, that "[w]e should develop interpretive principles"
for understanding the Constitution "from the goal of assuring the successful
operation of a deliberative democracy.'4 6 Sunstein does not attempt to "offer
a full elaboration and defense 47 of this theory in The Partial Constitution,
but he does outline the form that the defense might take:
This goal [of deliberative democracy] can be traced to the earliest
days of the American republic. It has been broadened and deepened
by important developments since the founding. The governing ideal
of deliberative democracy has a close connection with constitutional
aspirations as they have been understood at the important periods in
our history. An effort to build interpretive principles from this ideal
therefore has the advantage of continuity with the Constitution's
structure and history. The ideal also has considerable independent
appeal.48
Sunstein breaks down the principles of deliberative democracy into various
ingredients, which include commitments to "deliberation, citizenship,
agreement as a regulative ideal, and political equality."49 According to
Sunstein, courts should decide whether governmental action violates the
Constitution in light of these factors, rather than by reference to the status
quo.50
It is somewhat difficult to summarize what the principles of deliberative
democracy mandate in practical terms. Sunstein appears to present two
competing visions, one more restrictive than the other. At times, he seems to
say that the principles require the government to have an articulable public-
minded explanation that consistently and comprehensively justifies its acts.
Sunstein asserts, for example, that "the principle of impartiality," properly
understood, "requires government to provide reasons [for its acts] that can be
45. See id. at 104-13.
46. Id. at 133.
47. Id. at 134.
48. id. at 133-34.
49. Id. at 141.
50. Id. at 123, 141. Before arguing for principles of interpretation based on deliberative democracy,
Sunstein very briefly discusses substantive reasons for preserving the status quo, including arguments (1)
that change in the status quo usually will produce unexpected consequences, making matters worse than
before; (2) that frequent reexaminations of existing distributions of property undermine stability and settled
expectations; and (3) that we should have respect for the status quo and existing practices because they
often reflect centuries of experience and the common thought of millions of people. Id. at 127-31. Sunstein
recognizes that all of these arguments have some force, but finds none of them strong enough to form
general interpretive principles.
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intelligible to different people operating from different premises.' In other
places, however, he appears to relax this higher standard and suggest that the
principles of deliberative democracy merely require the government to engage
in "deliberation that has some autonomy from private pressures. ' 2 In other
words, the government only needs to avoid the influence of "naked
preferences" of private groups.5
3
B. Application of Sunstein's Theory to Current Issues
In the second part of The Partial Constitution, Sunstein applies his theory
to a great variety of contemporary issues. He reaches the following principal
conclusions:
[ T]he Constitution neither forbids nor requires affirmative
action;...
• [G]overnment restrictions on pornography and campaign
expenditures do not offend the First Amendment;...
* [The] government has very substantial discretion to fund, or not
fund, artistic projects; ...
* [T]he equal protection clause (if not the right to privacy) protects
women's right to have an abortion, and indeed compels
governmental funding of that right in cases of rape and
incest;...
" [O]ur present educational system violates the Constitution,
and... the President and Congress are under a constitutional
duty to remedy the situation; ...
* [T]here is no constitutional problem if government creates a right
of private access to the media or otherwise imposes obligations
of diversity and public affairs programming on broadcasters;
and...
* [T]he Constitution does not create a judicially enforceable right
to welfare or other forms of subsistence. 4
Sunstein's arguments on these points, made over the course of several hundred
pages, also defy concise summary. A few examples, though, illustrate his
ideas.
For instance, Sunstein discusses at length whether the government has the
power to regulate sexually explicit materials. 5 He explains that court
decisions presently do not allow the government to ban materials that depict
violence against women unless those materials are obscene. Sunstein notes that
courts have rejected the antiviolence form of restriction, which has been the
51. Id. at 24.
52. Id. at 38.
53. Id. at 25, 38.
54. Id. at 8 (format altered).
55. See id. at 261-70.
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basis for several recent local ordinances, because it establishes an "approved"
view of "how the sexes may relate to each other" in violation of the neutrality
principle as embodied in the First Amendment. 6
Sunstein rejects the law's distinction between obscenity and violent
pornography because he believes that the distinction impermissibly rests upon
status quo neutrality:
Obscenity law, insofar as it is tied to community standards, is ...
deemed neutral, but only because the class of prohibited speech is
defined by reference to existing social values. Antipornography
legislation [specifically aimed at the depiction of violence against
women] is deemed impermissibly partisan because the prohibited class
of speech is defined by less widely accepted ideas ... [such as the
idea] that sexual violence by men against women is a greater problem
than sexual violence by women against men .... 57
Sunstein thinks that the principles of deliberative democracy dictate that courts
stay out of this sort of debate, notwithstanding the First Amendment. In his
view, "[s]o long as any emerging [antipornography] law has the requisite
clarity and narrow scope, the appropriate forum for deliberation is the
democratic process, not the judiciary."58
The question of whether Congress must fund abortions for indigent women
in cases of rape or incest provides another good example of the application of
Sunstein's theory. He asserts that, under present law, Congress does not have
a duty to pay for abortion because the Supreme Court views a failure to fund
as inaction by the government, rather than action, and thus considers it
presumptively neutral and constitutional.
Sunstein criticizes the Court's understanding of the issue as being "based
on the indefensible conception of neutrality that we have encountered
throughout this book."59 He explains that neither "biology" nor "poverty"
justify the result that poor women cannot have abortions when they become
pregnant.60 Instead, the decision not to fund abortions "is a legal and a social
one.' Congress, after all, could fund abortions if it wished. Sunstein
explains more fully that "the failure to fund is not inaction at all. It represents
a conscious social choice, one that conscripts women in the cause of
incubation. It does not simply let 'nature' take its course. ' 62 Sunstein
56. Id. at 268 (quoting American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985),
aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986)).
57. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 269. Sunstein does not discuss the apparent
similarity between his argument here and the reasoning that he condemns in Muller v. Oregon. See supra
note 28.
58. THE PARTIAL CONSTITTION, supra note I, at 270.
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concludes that, at least in certain instances, the Constitution may require
Congress to fund abortion.63
After completing his discussion of these and numerous comparable issues,
Sunstein concludes The Partial Constitution with a thoughtful essay about the
roles of the various branches of government in interpreting the Constitution.'
He recognizes that courts have institutional limitations that prevent them from
forcing the rest of government to act in all instances in which the Constitution
might require action.65 Sunstein, therefore, makes clear that he is addressing
his argument as much to the legislative and executive branches of government
as to the courts.66
II. ORIGINALISM
Sunstein deserves praise for devoting a significant portion of his book to
originalism. Far from lying "outside the mainstream," 67 the theory in fact
represents a view shared by a great many lawyers and judges in this country.
Even if the Supreme Court does not always decide constitutional cases on the
basis of what the framers and ratifiers thought, their views play a consistently
prominent role in constitutional litigation.68 As a result, no work in
constitutional law that seeks to persuade a broad audience can afford to ignore
originalism. Although Sunstein disagrees with the theory, his generally
respectful analysis of Judge Bork's exposition of the theory accrues to his
credit.
Sunstein's argument nevertheless has three principal weaknesses. First,
Sunstein fails to explain fully the position that originalists would take on the
issue of status quo neutrality and thus leaves unclear why originalism poses a
problem for the thesis of his book. Second, Sunstein offers a somewhat
incomplete assessment of the justifications for originalism because he focuses
nearly exclusively on the argument presented in Robert Bork's The Tempting
of America. Third, Sunstein does not make clear exactly what sort of defense
of originalism would satisfy him.
63. See infra note 112.
64. See id. at 319-46.
65. See id. at 320.
66. See id. at 346.
67. Several members of the Senate Judiciary Committee declared that they voted against confirming
Judge Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court because his views were "outside the mainstream." See, e.g.,
Steven V. Roberts, 9-5 Panel Vote Against Bork Sends Nomination to Senate Amid Predictions of Defeat,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 7, 1987, at Al (quoting Senator DeConcini); John Hanrahan, Washington News, UPI, Oct.
6, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Archive File (quoting Senator Kennedy); cf. Reagan Rebukes
Bork Foes, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 26, 1987, at I (quoting President Reagan as saying that Bork's opponents were
outside the mainstream).
68. References to the framers of the Constitution, for example, have appeared in dozens of Supreme
Court opinions and hundreds of briefs filed in the Court during the past decade.
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A. The Threat of Originalism
Why does Sunstein need to refute originalism? He does not spell out a
reason explicitly in The Partial Constitution, and the answer may differ from
what one first expects. Originalism does not threaten Sunstein's thesis by
validating the status quo neutrality conception of impartiality. Instead,
originalism makes Sunstein's arguments against status quo neutrality irrelevant.
An originalist makes decisions of constitutionality according to the original
understanding of the Constitution. Sunstein's argument that the status quo
neutrality principle overlooks background law and fails to comport with the
"commitment to deliberative democracy," even if correct, cannot influence an
originalist's interpretation of the Constitution. These considerations might play
a role in devising future constitutions, but they cannot change the original
understanding of the Constitution we already have.
Discovering exactly what the framers and ratifiers thought about the
relevance of the status quo to particular subjects would require exhaustive
research. There was certainly a mixture of views. The framers probably would
not have objected to respecting the status quo in certain contexts. For example,
as Sunstein himself recognizes, certain constitutional provisions, such as the
Takings and Contracts Clauses, appear to rest on the premise that the
government should not disrupt existing distributions of resources, even if those
distributions depend on background rules of property and contract law.69
The framers and ratifiers, however, may not have understood other
provisions of the Constitution to require status quo neutrality. The Equal
Protection Clause is a good example. All legislation creates categories and
affects some people differently from others.7 ° Moreover, all new legislation
changes the status quo. An act that increases property tax rates, for example,
will not leave everyone as well off as they were before and may fall harder on
homeowners than renters, or vice versa. Although the new law might radically
alter the status quo, it surely would not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as
originally understood, for that reason alone. An originalist must accept status
quo neutrality as a valid constitutional argument to the extent that the framers
and ratifiers of the Constitution and its amendments understood it to be a valid
argument, but no further.
B. Incompleteness
Sunstein, as noted, attempts to counter the threat of originalism by taking
on The Tempting of America. Sunstein makes many valid observations about
69. See THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note I, at 153 ("[Tlhe takings and contracts clauses cannot
easily be read to create a constitutional baseline other than that of the status quo.").
-70. See generally Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL.
L. REV. 341 (1949).
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the book. Bork does not address at any length the need for interpretive
principles and he eschews discussion of the kinds of moral and political issues
that Sunstein finds relevant. Bork thus has little to say about the kinds of
questions that Sunstein considers crucial to determining what the Constitution
means. Sunstein's criticism of The Tempting of America, nevertheless, has two
significant shortcomings.
First, Sunstein largely repeats charges already leveled against Bork's book,
but he does not respond to arguments made in Bork's defense. Immediately
after Judge Bork wrote The Tempting of America, a number of reviewers
criticized it on precisely the grounds that Sunstein sets forth in The Partial
Constitution. Judge Richard Posner and Professors Ronald Dworkin and Bruce
Ackerman, for example, each faulted Bork for failing to recognize that a reader
may interpret any text in a variety of ways and for failing to justify the
originalist method.7'
Since the publications of these and other reviews, however, several authors
have written powerful responses in support of The Tempting of America.
Professor Lino Graglia, for example, questioned whether it makes sense to
require justificatory reasons for originalism of the kind that Sunstein
demands.72 Raoul Berger, moreover, has supplied a variety of historical
arguments in favor of Bork's position.73 If Sunstein has replies to these
responses, he should have included them in his book rather than simply
reiterating criticism that by now has become familiar.
Second, even if Sunstein could show that Bork had not supplied a
complete defense of originalism in The Tempting of America, that would not
prove that the theory has no defense. Although Sunstein briefly responds to an
essay by Judge Frank Easterbrook,74 he does not touch upon the arguments
of many others who have written in defense of originalism' Practical
considerations surely limited how much Sunstein could say about the topic, but
this omission is troubling nonetheless.
71. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition, 99 YALE L.J. 1419, 1421 (1990);
Ronald Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 668 (1990); Richard A. Posner, Bork and
Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (1990). Even Sunstein has made the same arguments in a
previous review. See Sunstein, What Judge Bork Should Have Said, supra note 7, at 205 ("Because [The
Tempting of Anerical relies on [originalist] principles without defending or even recognizing them, it
provides no basis for its own approach.").
72. See Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019
(1992).
73. See Raoul Berger, Activist Censures of Robert Bork, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 993 (1991).
74. See THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note I, at 99-100 (citing Frank Easterbrook, Abstraction
and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349 (1992)).
75. There are several collections of arguments in support of interpreting the Constitution as originally
understood. See, e.g., INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N.
Rakove ed., 1990); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, ORIGINAL MEANING
JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK (1987); see also LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF TEXT:
DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1991).
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C. Interpretation or Legitimacy
Perhaps Sunstein did not say more about the arguments for originalism
because he felt that originalists bore the burden of proof on the issue and had
not yet made a convincing case. That possibility, though, raises the question
of what Sunstein thinks that originalists must show. A careful reading of The
Partial Constitution suggests that he has an unusual standard.
Sunstein apparently would ask that originalists not only justify their
method of interpreting the Constitution, but also that they prove that the
Constitution, enacted into law in 1789, has continuing legitimacy. Sunstein,
indeed, criticizes Bork and Easterbrook for failing to recognize that the
Constitution and judicial decisions made in its name cannot be "justified
simply because [they] follow from a judgment made by the people-especially
when the relevant people died long ago, and indeed excluded large segments
of the polity (including all blacks and all women). 76 Sunstein explains that
"[a] prior agreement of that sort does not provide a moral justification for
obedience. Ultimately obedience is justified, if it is, for some amalgam of
substantive political reasons .... By itself, however, the fact that there was
agreement on the document many generations ago is insufficient for
legitimacy., 77 In this passage, Sunstein seems to be calling for Bork and other
originalists to demonstrate that the Constitution-as opposed to something
else-empowers and restrains the government.
If Sunstein truly holds this position, he is going too far. In writing about
how judges should interpret the Constitution, Judge Bork and others certainly
do not have to explain what makes the Constitution law. That may be an
interesting and important question, but it is not a question of interpretive
principles or a question that judges who already have sworn to uphold the
Constitution must decide.
III. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND A REPUBLIC OF REASONS
Sunstein decided not to supply a complete defense of his theory that the
nation's commitment to deliberative democracy-government in which reason
rather than naked power prevails-should provide principles for interpreting
the Constitution. He certainly deserves no criticism for this decision. The
Partial Constitution undertakes enough ambitious tasks for a single volume.
76. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note I, at 100.
77. Id. Sunstein ultimately suggests that a variety of factors may justify obedience to the Constitution,
including its largely democratic pedigree and the possibly chaotic consequences of abandoning it. Id. Given
Sunstein's open-ended conception of constitutional interpretation, however, what he means by obedience
certainly differs from what an originalist would mean.
78. Id. at 134 ("I will not be attempting to offer a full elaboration and defense of deliberative
democracy or to measure it against the many alternative sources of interpretive principles. To undertake
such tasks, it would be necessary to set out a complete theory of what government should do.").
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Yet if Sunstein chooses to present a more complete defense in a later work, he
will have his hands full, and not just with the arguments of the originalists.
Antisthenes the Cynic, a defender of the philosophy of nominalism, once
had an argument with Plato about whether it was possible to discern the nature
of a horse. He complained to Plato, who he thought was looking at the matter
too abstractly, that "A horse I can see, but horseness I cannot see."7 9 Sunstein
will encounter the same kind of objection in trying to prove that our republic
has the abstract feature of "deliberative democracy.'80
Our Constitution, despite its virtues, lacks consistency. Some provisions
of the document no doubt serve to promote deliberation and curtail majority
power. The Speech or Debate Clause is one excellent example. 8' The
provisions that break up factions by staggering terms of office and dividing
representatives geographically provide other illustrations.82
The Constitution, however, includes many other provisions that do not
require decisions based on the rational debate one might expect in a "republic
of reasons." For example, the President has the power to veto bills for good
reason, bad reason, or no reason at all.83 Congress, in turn, has the power to
overrule the President's veto not when it can devise better arguments than the
President, but whenever it can muster a two-thirds majority to override the
veto.g
Indeed, the Constitution contains striking examples of decisions not made
by reasoning. The three-fifths compromise is one.85 Logic certainly did not
dictate that slaves should count as only sixty percent of a person for census
purposes. The rule makes no sense by itself; it came about only as a
compromise between factions lacking the power to obtain exactly what they
each wanted.86 The provision preventing Congress from regulating the
79. 8 SIMPLICIUS, COMMENTARIA IN ARISTOTELEM 208 (Charles L. Kalbfleisch ed., 1907).
80. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. I ("[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and
Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.").
82. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (staggered terms for Senators); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (geographical distribution
of House seats).
83. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
84. See id. To some extent, these powers promote deliberative democracy structurally by creating some
checks on power.
85. See id. art 1, § 2, cl. 3.
86. Representatives from the Southern states wanted to count slaves as whole persons so that their
states would have more Representatives in Congress. They argued, without a trace of irony, that slaves were
equivalent to workers in the North. Representatives from the Northern states did not want to count slaves
at all, arguing that they were property and that other property, such as cattle, did not count for census
purposes. Neither argument carried the day. Instead, the competing factions compromised on counting
slaves as three-fifths of a person. Madison and at least one other participant in the Constitutional
Convention describe these debates and the compromise in their notes. See H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong.,
1st Sess. 354-55, 764 (1927) (reprinting Madison's journal from July I1, 1787, and notes taken by Hon.
Robert Yates on June II, 1787). For a rather weak rationalization of the three-fifths compromise, see THE
FEDERALIST No. 54 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison).
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importation of slaves until 1808 (rather than, say, 1798 or 1818) provides
another example of an unreasoned compromise.8 7
As these counterexamples demonstrate, any attempt to say that the
Constitution creates a "republic of reasons" based on "principles of deliberative
democracy" is an overgeneralization. They also suggest that searching for
abstract principles to govern all constitutional issues involves great risks.
Sunstein might see "deliberative democracy" in various places in the
Constitution. Others, however, may look at the three-fifths compromise and
1808 slave trade provision and see arbitrariness and tolerance of evil. Surely
the latter ideas, although clearly embodied in the Constitution, should not
influence all constitutional debate.
This criticism should not come as a surprise to Sunstein, because he
clearly understands the problem of overgeneralization. For example, even
though he insists that the Constitution generally does not require status quo
neutrality, he admits that some provisions-like the Takings Clause-do
embody that principle.88 In other words, in some instances, Sunstein is willing
to accept the fact that the Constitution is a rather mixed bag. It is thus odd that
Sunstein did not recognize that deliberative democracy probably does not
supply the only principles for interpreting the Constitution.
What is an alternative? Originalism supplies one answer. The idea is not
to look for "horseness" in the Constitution-that is, abstract general principles
about the nature of our republic. They may or may not exist. Originalists
would say, simply, that the Constitution promotes deliberative democracy
through the provisions that were originally understood to do so, but not
elsewhere.
IV. STATUS Quo NEUTRALITY IN THE COURTS
Regardless of whether the Constitution embodies a general and consistent
commitment to deliberative democracy, Sunstein makes a valid and important
point in his discussion of the "status quo neutrality" conception of impartiality.
When considering the constitutionality of a statute that changes existing
distributions, courts should not forget that natural forces alone did not create
the status quo. Instead, courts should recognize the contribution of background
law, especially the common law, and judge the new law not by itself, but in
the context of the existing law.
If Sunstein were limiting his book to this point, he would be on solid
ground. He goes further though, contending that the Supreme Court regularly
has used status quo neutrality reasoning to reach its decisions. This view
should strike most casual observers of the Court as odd, given all of the
87. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 1.
88. See THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 153-55.
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sweeping changes the Court has wrought in society. A significant weakness of
The Partial Constitution is that some of the most prominent cases that Sunstein
cites as examples do not support his conclusion. Sunstein may be condemning
a practice that does not occur as often as he suggests.
A. Bakers
Sunstein makes Lochner v. New York89 a centerpiece of his argument. He
asserts that the Court in Lochner struck down a state law limiting the number
of hours that bakers could work because it thought that the statute served a
redistributive purpose, and thus violated status quo neutrality. This analysis
seems rather strained. As Sunstein himself admits, the Court never said that the
statute served a redistributive purpose and never said anything about the status
quo neutrality conception of impartiality.9" Sunstein merely reads that
rationale into the Court's decision. It is more helpful to look at what the case
actually said.
Justice Peckham wrote the opinion of the Court in Lochner. He sought to
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the statute in three steps. First, Peckham
asserted that as a general rule, a state cannot regulate contracts. To support this
proposition, he noted the Court's previous holding in Allgeyer v. Louisiana
9l
that "[t]he general right to make a contract in relation to [one's] business is
part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution." 92 Second, Peckham asserted that as an exception
to the general rule, a state could restrict the right to make a contract in the
exercise of its police powers. Various precedents established that these powers
included protecting the health and safety of workers and wards of the state.93
Third, Peckham asserted that the statute at issue did not fit into this police
power exception. He reasoned that restricting the working hours of bakers did
not really protect their health or safety.94 Peckham thus concluded that the
Allgeyer decision controlled the case and that the statute was unconstitutional.
Of these three steps, the first-in which Peckham asserted that the
Fourteenth Amendment generally prohibits states from regulating
contracts-was the most important. Peckham's citation of Allgeyer for that
proposition was undoubtedly correct, for he happened to have written the
opinion of the Court in Allgeyer as well as in Lochner. The key issue then is
where the Court in Allgeyer found the rule that the freedom to make a contract
89. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
90. See THE PARTIAL CONSTITUrION, supra note 1, at 47.
91. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
92. 198 U.S. at 53.
93. See id. at 53-55.
94. See id. at 55-64.
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is a "liberty" protected from regulation by the Fourteenth Amendment. Here
is what Justice Peckham said in Allgeyer:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of
the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person,
as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the
citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to
use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or
avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may
be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned. 95
Where did this definition of "liberty" come from? Unfortunately, Justice
Peckham did not say. Following this long declaration, he provided no citation.
Apparently, Peckham just made it up.
Justice Holmes, in his famous dissent in Lochner, rejected the
understanding of liberty expressed in Allgeyer. He maintained that citizens
traditionally have not had a freedom to make unregulated contracts. Holmes
cited longstanding restrictions, such as "Sunday laws and usury laws," as
examples.96 Emphasizing the need to look at existing practices, Holmes
wrote:
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions
of our people and our law.97
Holmes-if anyone-was arguing for a decision based on the status quo. He
thought that the New York statute was constitutional simply because it was a
"traditional" kind of law.
Lochner strongly cuts against Sunstein's thesis in two ways. First, it shows
that the Court does not always base its decisions on status quo neutrality.
Justice Peckham and the other members of the majority did not rely on the
status quo as a reason to invalidate the statute; to them the status quo was
irrelevant. Moreover, they rejected the position that Holmes took in dissent,
even though he did rely on the status quo.
95. 165 U.S. at 589.
96. 198 U.S. at 75.
97. Id. at 76. After reciting this quotation in his book, Judge Bork commented: "So Holmes... merely
disagreed with Peckham and the majority about which principles were fundamental. Nor did he explain why
a free people could not decide to change or abandon principles supported by tradition but not by the
Constitution." BORK, supra note 38, at 45-46.
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Second, and perhaps more seriously, the case shows how easy it is to read
the status quo rationale into a case that does not explicitly contain that
rationale. The legal status quo often has several dimensions. For example,
while the statute in Lochner altered the status quo by placing new restrictions
on bakeries, it respected the status quo in the sense that it was not a novel type
of regulation. As a result, no matter how Lochner had been decided, Sunstein
could have characterized it as a decision biased in favor of the status quo.
Despite these problems, Sunstein stands on solid ground when he says that
the Court erred in Lochner. The case should have come out the way Holmes
said that it should, but for a different reason. The Court decided Allgeyer and
Lochner incorrectly because it invented the freedom of contract out of thin air,
not because it cared too much or too little about the status quo.
B. Pregnancy Counselors
Another of Sunstein's prominent examples, Rust v. Sullivan,9" also does
not support his thesis that the Court regularly decides cases on grounds of
status quo neutrality. That case involved what Sunstein and the popular media
commonly, though inappropriately, refer to as the "gag rule."99 As noted
above, Sunstein says that the Court "upheld a regulation forbidding clinics
[that received federal funds] from giving advice about abortion"'00 on
grounds that the restriction did not leave anyone "worse off than she was
before the program was enacted."' ' Sunstein inaccurately characterizes the
facts and holding of the case: Rust v. Sullivan did not in fact involve a
regulation categorically forbidding clinics from giving abortion advice; and the
Court made clear that such a restriction would not be upheld merely because
it left the persons whom it affected no worse off.
The actual facts of the case are revealing. In 1970, Congress enacted Title
X, a law providing federal funding for family planning services. The statute
stated that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be
used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning."102 In
1988, the Secretary of Health and Human Services promulgated a regulation
under the statute providing that "[a] title X project may not provide counseling
concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning or provide
referral for abortion as a method of family planning."'1 3 Several Title X
grantees-recipients of the federal money-challenged the regulation on the
ground that it "condition[ed] the receipt of a benefit, Title X funding, on the
98. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
99. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note I, at 310.
100. Id. at 86.
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988).
103. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1992).
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relinquishment of a constitutional right, the right to engage in abortion
advocacy and counseling."'t4
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court rejected this
argument, not because the government had the power to condition the receipt
of Title X benefits on the relinquishment of free speech rights, but because the
government had not done so. The Court's opinion says so in unmistakably
clear terms:
The Secretary's regulations do not force the Title X grantee to give
up abortion-related speech; they merely require that the grantee keep
such activities separate and distinct from Title X activities. Title X
expressly distinguishes between a Title X grantee and a Title X
project.... The regulations govern the scope of the Title X project's
activities, and leave the grantee unfettered in its other activities. The
Title X grantee can continue to perform abortions, provide abortion-
related services, and engage in abortion advocacy; it simply is
required to conduct those activities through programs that are separate
and independent from the project that receives Title X funds. 1°5
In other words, contrary to what Sunstein suggests, the grantees could advocate
abortion even if they accepted the federal money."0 6
Immediately following this passage, the Court reaffirmed the validity of
what it called its "unconstitutional conditions" cases. The Court explained that
it previously had found First Amendment violations in "situations in which the
government ha[d] placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than
on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient
from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally
funded program."'17 Rust v. Sullivan, however, simply did not present that
issue. In sum, Rust v. Sullivan does not show that the Court relies on the status
quo conception of neutrality. The Court did not use the status quo as an
argument for its holding and, in dicta, suggested that it would not accept status
quo reasoning if the facts were what Sunstein asserts.
104. 111 S. Ct. at 1763.
105. Id. at 1774.
106. Sunstein appears to have understood the actual facts of Rust because he quotes the Chief Justice
as saying that Rust is not a case "in which the government has placed a condition on the recipient of the
subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the
protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program." THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra
note 1, at 86-87.
Yet, despite his inclusion of this quotation, Sunstein misdescribes the statute in each of the three
portions of his book discussing the case. See id. at 86 ("a regulation forbidding clinics from giving advice
about abortion"); id. at 229 ("regulations banning federally funded family planning services from engaging
in counseling concerning, referrals for, and activities advocating abortion"); id. at 310 ("the so-called
abortion gag rule, forbidding clinics receiving federal funds to provide abortion-related counseling").
107. II1 S. Ct. at 1774.
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C. Other Cases
Even if Lochner and Rust do not provide good examples for Sunstein, that
does not mean that the Court never decides cases on the basis of status quo
neutrality. The Court may do so; it decides more than a hundred cases a year
and certainly does not give the best of reasons for all of them. Some of the
many other cases that Sunstein cites in The Partial Constitution in fact may
provide examples that can withstand close scrutiny. Lochner and Rust,
however, suggest that he has overstated the extent to which the Supreme Court
relies on the status quo neutrality conception of impartiality.
V. STATUS Quo NEUTRALITY OUTSIDE THE COURTS
The question now arises whether the problems suggested above really
matter to Sunstein's argument. Would the Supreme Court's refusal to endorse
the principles of deliberative democracy undermine what Sunstein seeks to
accomplish? Does the actual number of times that the Supreme Court has
relied on the status quo neutrality argument make a difference? Probably not.
The foregoing criticisms, even if valid, should not trouble Sunstein very much.
Sunstein surely is not writing disinterestedly about the ability of the
government to change the status quo. He wants actual change, perhaps even
very extensive change, in existing legal arrangements. For this reason, he
stresses throughout The Partial Constitution that he is addressing the book
more to politicians than to members of the judiciary.10 8 As Professor Sanford
Levinson, an early and enthusiastic reviewer of the book, has put it: "The
Partial Constitution is now, among other things, a memorandum to the White
House about the way that 'new liberals' (in whose camp Sunstein would count
himself) should respond to the unexpected opportunity [presented by President
Clinton's election] to reshape American constitutional doctrine."'0 9
To achieve sweeping legal change, Sunstein needs to persuade participants
in the executive and legislative branches of government that the Constitution
does not prohibit redistribution as a general matter. He thus emphasizes that,
at a minimum, the government usually may enact new laws that alter existing
allocations. If members of Congress or the Administration go so far as to
accept Sunstein's further thesis that they have a constitutional duty to pursue
108. See, e.g., THE PARTIAL CONSTrrtTlMON, supra note 1, at 10 ("[M]any of the constitutional
proposals set out here are intended not for the judges at all, but for others thinking about constitutional
liberties in the modem state."). Sunstein does not say much explicitly about the practical political impact
that he wants or expects his views to have. In several places in the book, however, he speaks very
favorably of the general reorientation of government that took place during the New Deal. See id. at 6-7,
57-61. Perhaps he would favor a similarly broad reorientation of our present legal framework.
109. Levinson, supra note I, at 40.
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the principles of deliberative democracy to their logical conclusions, all the
better.
The criticisms of Sunstein's book presented earlier in this Review do not
stand in the way of these objectives. Arguing that the Supreme Court has acted
too conservatively in the past, even if not wholly accurate, still serves a
purpose. It strengthens the argument for more change now. In any event, a
little deliberation here and there would not hurt the country, even if the
Constitution does not require as much of it as Sunstein suggests.
Whether Sunstein's theories of deliberative democracy truly would
facilitate the reworking of society that Sunstein wants, however, remains
unclear. Sunstein does not think that the Constitution prohibits the government
from altering the status quo, but he does set a high standard for new
legislation. He insists, as noted, that "the principle of impartiality requires
government to provide reasons [for its acts] that can be intelligible to different
people operating from different premises. ' 'I '
To the extent that he is serious about that standard,"' Sunstein may be
making it more difficult for government to act, for a simple reason: Factions
often have to compromise, and compromises tend to produce somewhat
arbitrary results. Consider, for example, the issue of abortion counseling. When
Congress was considering the legislation involved in Rust v. Sullivan, it
probably had to make a choice. Some members of Congress surely wanted to
fund clinics that would provide information about all lawful forms of birth
control, including abortion. Others surely did not want to fund clinics at all.
Each side could present reasons to the other that presumably would satisfy
the test of impartiality. Neither side, after all, was singling out abortion
counseling for special treatment." 2 Ultimately, however, Congress took a
middle course-funding family planning, but denying money to abortion
advocacy. Sunstein says that the compromise violates the impartiality principle.
That conclusion, however, may prevent the government from doing anything.
As the current administration has discovered as it tackles controversial topics
like gays in the military, the budget, and health care reform, not much happens
without compromise.
Perhaps the founders of this nation wanted the "republic of reasons" that
Sunstein describes. Perhaps the framers even wanted to hold the government
to Sunstein's impartiality test-even if that test often would prevent
government action when disputing sides could compromise but not convince
110. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 24.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
112. Sunstein objects primarily to "selective funding" decisions, not policies of paying for everything
or nothing. THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 317. By way of comparison, as noted, Sunstein
argues that the government "must fund abortion in cases of rape or incest, at least if it is funding childbirth
in such cases." Id. at 13.
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each other."3 But is this what Sunstein wants from his envisioned "republic
of reasons?" Ironically, by replacing "status quo neutrality" with his conception
of impartiality, Sunstein might make it harder rather than easier to change
existing law."
4
113. Many of the Founders had quite conservative views when it came to the status quo. Even the
Declaration of Independence-the most revolutionary of all official documents-prudently and
incongruously cautions: "[A]II experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils
are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed." THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
114. Sunstein seems to recognize this possibility early in the book. See THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION,
supra note 1, at 25 ("[Iif interest-group pluralism does describe contemporary politics, a requirement of
impartiality, understood as a call for public-regarding justifications for government outcomes, is inconsistent
with the very nature of government. It imposes on politics a requirement that simply cannot be met.").
Oddly, however, he says little more about it.
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